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Abstract
In policy implementation the roles of ambiguity and uncertainty have been theorized but insuf-
ficiently tested. This study contributes to the policy process literature by arguing that ambigu-
ity and uncertainty are two sides of the same coin in implementation. Their effects are linked 
to the credibility of policy, the clarity of goals, and agency capacity. We analyze ambiguity and 
uncertainty through the lens of post-disaster policy in local government using primary quali-
tative data from 22 local government officials across 8 counties and 6 cities that were affected 
by Hurricane Harvey. We find that the credibility of a policy is evaluated separately from the 
credibility of the formulator; experience moderates the effects of ambiguity; and uncertainty 
in implementation has a similar effect as ambiguity and is not lessened with more informa-
tion. The distinction between the political manipulation of ambiguous circumstances and the 
rational, technocratic approach to gathering more information to reduce uncertainty may be 
less clear than previously considered.  
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Introduction
A fundamental challenge in advancing knowledge of the policy process is understanding the 
apparent gap between how policy is formulated and implemented (Baier et al., 1986; Matland, 
1995; O’Toole, 1995; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). There are two common explanations: the 
first is that ambiguity in formulation allows for political deal making to pave the way for policy 
change (Herweg et al., 2018); the second is that understanding technical and scientific infor-
mation in the policy process creates uncertainty that actors must contend with when weighing 
policy options (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; Weible et al., 2009). The extent to which policy ac-
tors can manage ambiguity and uncertainty contributes to learning about which policy tools to 
implement after a failure (Howlett, Ramesh & Wu 2015; May 1992), particularly after a disas-
ter (Albright & Crow 2019; Birkland 1997; Crow & Albright 2019; Sapat et al. 2011). 
The objective of this study is to examine the role of ambiguity and uncertainty in policy im-
plementation. On one hand, policy implementers face uncertainty, or having to make deci-
sions in the face of limited information (Jones & Baumgartner, 2012). Uncertainty is resolved 
with more information or better use of existing information, allowing for boundedly rational, 
technocratic decision-making. On the other hand, ambiguity, or that idea that policy makers 
will have different ways of understanding policy problems (Herweg et al., 2018; Zahariadis, 
2008), is resolved by political activity that allows for different interpretations of the policy 
problem (Cairney, 2019). We conceive of ambiguity and uncertainty as cross-cutting concepts 
in the Multiple Streams Framework (Herweg et al., 2018), the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(Jenkins-Smith, Nohrsted, & Weible Sabatier 2014), Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (Jones & 
Baumgartner, 2012), and policy learning (Dunlop & Radaelli, 2018).  
The analysis relies on data collected from open-ended interviews with 22 local government 
officials in 14 cities and counties in Texas that were implementing hurricane and flood haz-
ard mitigation policies after Hurricane Harvey. We find that implementation is influenced by 
ambiguity, but experience with the policy may moderate their effects. We also find that uncer-
tainty is not always lessened by more information, therefore rendering its influence to be more 
similar to ambiguity than previously conceived.
A Framework for Understanding Ambiguity and Uncertainty 
in Implementation: Credibility and Clarity
We introduce a theoretical framework grounded in the policy implementation literature fo-
cused on evaluating the impact of ambiguity and uncertainty as barriers to policy implementa-
tion (Fowler, 2020; Goggin et al., 1990; Manna & Moffitt, 2019; Matland, 1995; O’Toole, 1995; 
Zahariadis, 2008). By operationalizing key concepts of ambiguity and uncertainty, we can un-
pack the influence of each of these concepts on policy implementation within a nested system 
of government. Broadly speaking, ambiguity refers to the idea that there are multiple ways to 
interpret policies (Zahariadis, 2008), and uncertainty refers to the idea that policy implement-
ers may not understand those policies (Jones & Baumgartner, 2012). In this study, we examine 
implementation in the U.S. federal system of government. This means that policy implementa-
tion occurs within a nested system of federal, state, and local levels where local policy makers 
face significant challenges in implementing policies designed by federal and state agencies. 
The literature makes a clear distinction between ambiguity, which cannot be lessened with 
more information, and uncertainty, which can be resolved with more information (Cairney, 
2019). We use the frame of policy credibility in implementation to articulate the dynamics 
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of ambiguity. Uncertainty is examined in terms of the clarity of policy goals and capacity of 
municipal governments to implement mitigation and recovery policies.  The central theory 
of this study is that the credibility of policymakers, the clarity of policy goals, and capacity of 
implementers are important influences on decisions made during implementation.  
Ambiguity, Credibility and Package Deals
In order to implement a policy, local decision makers must come to a consensus on what the 
policy problem is and which policy tools to use to solve it. Ambiguity refers to the idea that 
because there are many ways to understand a policy problem (Cairney, 2019), the goals of a 
proposed policy, and the means to achieve the desired goals (Matland, 1995), it is difficult for 
officials to come to a consensus. Thus, political gamesmanship develops between policy imple-
menters competing to push forward their preferred problem definitions and policy solutions. 
Policy implementers may not have the time or ability to gather and analyze all available infor-
mation and will likely rely on sources they trust and adapt information to beliefs and biases 
they already hold (Cairney, 2019).
The literature suggests there is a clear relationship between the perceived credibility of the 
institutions which create a policy, the messages they send, and the willingness of local gov-
ernment officials to implement said policy. The communications model of intergovernmental 
implementation asserts that messages sent by authoritative senders to willing receivers will 
be more quickly and faithfully acted upon than less credible messages sent to unwilling receiv-
ers (Goggin et al., 1990). The concern for how bureaucratic discretion is used is whether the 
messages being sent from top-level government agencies are perceived as credible, whether 
the sender is considered authoritative, and whether local governments are willing to act upon 
the information. In this model, state governments are often in the role of intermediaries and 
interpreters between national and local governments (Hill & Hupe, 2002).
For the use of bureaucratic discretion in the context of policy implementation, two important 
questions are: (1) whether the messages received from the federal government are perceived to 
be credible, and; (2) the extent to which those messages are considered to be authoritative as 
they are sent from federal to state to local officials responsible for hazards and disasters.  The 
relative authoritativeness of the federal government with respect to mitigation has been un-
even. For example, federal incentives to mitigate have been relatively ineffective at influencing 
local planning for disasters (Berke et al., 2014). 
Operationalizing and identifying credibility can be a challenge because it is based on the per-
ception of the policy by an implementer (May & Jochim, 2013). Political commitment is an 
important signal for the credibility of a policy (Liu et al., 2018). In a nested governance sys-
tem, where the local implementing government is on the receiving end of policies that have 
already been formulated, perceived credibility becomes even more complicated. We distinguish 
between the credibility of the agency sending the policy message and the credibility of the 
policy that agency is sending the message about.  Decoupling the credibility of the agency and 
the credibility of the policy allows for the possibility that a credible actor may encourage imple-
mentation of a policy that lacks credibility, or an actor that lacks credibility might encourage 
implementation of a policy that is credible. 
Thus, this study poses the following:
Proposition 1: Policies are less likely to be implemented when the credibility of the 
actors who formulated the policy is low.
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We expect that implementation of various policy tools in the post-disaster environment will be 
affected by ambiguity. For policy implementation after a disaster in a nested system of govern-
ment, we expect that where the policy is mostly transactional and administrative – for example 
disbursing personal assistance to persons adversely affected by the disaster – there will be low 
ambiguity. In contrast, where the policy is less transactional – for example when changing 
building codes - ambiguity about the policy’s goals will remain low but the political conflict will 
be high because changing the building codes, thus increasing cost of construction, is highly 
contested (Albright & Crow, 2015; O’Donovan, 2017b). Through the lens  of ambiguity and 
conflict (Matland, 1995), we would expect to see outcomes determined by resources in trans-
actional and administrative policy areas and outcomes determined by political power in less 
transactional policy areas. 
The idea of political compromise and package deals that happen at the highest policy making 
levels during formulation can undermine the credibility of a policy in the eyes of the local actors 
in agencies responsible for implementation (Zahariadis, 2008). This is particularly true when 
implementation happens in a nested system of government, where the strategies and tactics 
used in policy formulation happen without the inclusion of the local policy makers responsible 
for policy implementation. Policies which are a part of a package of policy programs are likely to 
be the result of political deal making, gamesmanship and manipulation of the policy problem, 
and are thus likely be more ambiguous. Thus, this study proposes the following:
Proposition 2: Policies are less likely to be implemented when they are part of a pack-
age of policy programs. 
Uncertainty, Clarity, and Capacity
Understanding the differences between the stated intention of a policy and its outcome is an 
important problem of policy implementation (Ferman, 1990; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; 
O’Toole, 1995). The literature suggests that all interested staff and agencies might agree on 
what the end result of the policy should be but they do not necessarily agree on how to get 
there (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). 
Evidence-based policy making (EBPM) suggests that while policy makers may have limited time 
and attention to deal with problems, they are goal oriented and desire to get decisions “right.” 
The EBPM model predicts that policy makers desire to seek out evidence to determine the best 
possible solutions (Cairney, 2019); where policy goals are clear and messages sent regarding 
the policies are easily interpreted, implementation is more likely. Thus, the clarity of a policy 
in implementation is critical. In the US context, policy implementation can often take place 
in a nested system where a great deal of responsibility rests with state and local governments. 
For example, the role that states play is important because planning mandates, particularly 
for land use and hazard mitigation, are influential on the capacity and quality of local land use 
plans (Berke et al., 2014). This is because the federal government shares most resources and 
creates obligations for states in many cases. State governments are therefore in the middle 
of the communications chain between the top-level policy designers and local implementers. 
Crucially, “state level implementers form the nexus for the communication channels and these 
implementers are the target of the implementation-related messages transmitted from both 
federal and local level senders” (Lester & Goggin, 1998). Indeed, when the policy standards 
and expectations about enforcement are confusing, implementation may be undermined (Liu 
et al., 2018). 
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When the federal government sends implementation messages that are considered unclear, 
states play an important role in sending more authoritative messages to local governments 
that implementation is important. When the federal government sends messages about policy 
preferences to states, the messages can be distorted, either intentionally or unintentionally 
(Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). As recipients, “state level implementers must interpret a bar-
rage of messages. Structuring the interpretation process are the form and content of the mes-
sages and the legitimacy and reputation of the sender. Therein lies the key to implementation’s 
variability” (Lester & Goggin, 1998). 
The clarity of a policy output is potentially related to the clarity of the information about the 
policy goals. Therefore:
Proposition 3: Policies are more likely to be implemented when policy makers send 
clear messages about the goals of a policy.
Finally, the capacity of government is important for implementation.  We define capacity as 
the ability of a local government to reduce uncertainty about policy tools. There is a signifi-
cant body of literature that indicates that mid-level government managers are important for 
creating the conditions under which ground-level implementers can interpret a policy in a way 
that is consistent with its stated goals (Cloutier et al., 2016; Hupe, 2011; May & Winter, 2009; 
Meier & O’Toole, 2002; Ricucci, 2005). 
We conceive of capacity as the ability of boundedly rational decision makers in local govern-
ment (Jones, 2003; Simon, 1991)to make a policy choice after disaster. That ability to make a 
choice is bounded by cognitive ability and governing capacity to interpret policy goals. Munici-
palities play an important role in translating national policy goals. The extent to which mu-
nicipal managers emphasize national goals facilitates consistency in street-level bureaucrats 
implementing policies that are consistent with the national goals (May & Winter, 2007). If 
there is uncertainty at the local level about the goals of a policy, its successful implementation 
is less likely (Goggin et al., 1990), thus:
Proposition 4: Policies are less likely to be implemented when policy implementers 
are unable to interpret the goals of a policy.
Case, Methodology and Data
This study uses primary qualitative data on local government decision making after Hurricane 
Harvey. A qualitative approach is appropriate for this study because our objective is to identify 
the characteristics of ambiguity and uncertainty, rather than predict the effects of them. Hur-
ricane Harvey was selected as the case because of its severity, scope, and impact on varying 
communities across a wide region of the State of Texas. Hurricane Harvey made landfall near 
Rockport, Texas, on August 26, 2017, as a Category 4 storm. Harvey affected 32 counties in 
Southeast Texas, warranting a Presidential Disaster Declaration (Chokshi & Astor 2017). Al-
though the damage was widespread, the severity of the Hurricane varied significantly from one 
community to another. For example, the city of Houston experienced Harvey as a significant 
rain event, causing urban surface flooding. But communities along the Coastal Bend region 
experienced the effects of Hurricane as a wind event and the Gulf Coast region of Texas expe-
rienced Harvey as a flooding event. It ties with Hurricane Katrina as the costliest hurricane in 
United States history (Blake & Zelinsky 2018). Cities and counties were selected to account for 
varying impact of the hurricane—major cities like Houston felt the effects of the disaster, as 
did rural counties with no major cities, like Brazoria County. 
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Using an open-ended interview questionnaire that was guided by the literature, we conducted 
15 open-ended interviews with 22 local government officials across 8 counties and 6 cities 
impacted by Hurricane Harvey in August 2018 and March 2019.  The interview subjects were 
selected because we identified them to be key decision makers in their communities about 
post-disaster policy implementation. The interview subjects included county judges (an elected 
position in the State of Texas that functions like a county executive), emergency managers, 
community planners, mitigation specialists, floodplain managers, city managers, and long-
term recovery specialists.  A codebook was developed to conduct a content analysis of the in-
terview transcripts and we conducted a preliminary analysis of a cross-section of the inter-
views to pilot test the codebook. Some terms were refined, and additional codes were included 
to clarify for evidence of credibility, communications, and capacity prior to and after Hurricane 
Harvey.   The interview transcripts were analyzed in QDA Miner, a computer assisted qualita-
tive data analysis package (CAQDAS) created by Provalis Research.
Each interview was coded separately by two independent coders. The key variables of interest 
for this paper are included in Appendix A. After the interviews were coded, intercoder reli-
ability was checked. Intercoder reliability was 70.8% for frequency of codes per case, 16.4% 
for presence or absence per case, and 69.4% for agreement by code importance. Discrepan-
cies were resolved by agreement between independent coders. Frequency counts were then 
conducted of the coded segments of each interview. These frequency counts were then used in 
the analysis and cross-tabulation. In some charts, the frequency counts were transformed into 
categorical variables. For example, to determine whether the speaker saw FEMA as credible, 
not credible, or neutral, the total number of mentions of FEMA was analyzed. If the majority 
of the mentions were “not credible”, then the interview was coded as “FEMA not credible”; if 
a clear majority of mentions were “credible”, the interview was coded as “FEMA credible”, if 
there was no clear majority, or if the majority of mentions were coded as “neutral”, the overall 
interview was coded as “FEMA neutral.” For some variables, neutral and not frustrated were 
merged into a single category. 
Secondary data measuring demographic and political characteristics was also included in this 
study. The demographic data is from the U.S. Census Bureau. The 2016 voting data was pulled 
from the M.I.T Election Data Science Lab in the U.S. President Precinct-Level Returns 2016 
database (MIT Election Data and Science Lab, 2018). For the municipalities, their individual 
precinct maps were projected onto a map displaying municipal boundaries to create a list of 
included precincts for each municipality. If any part of a precinct was inside the municipal 
boundary, the votes from the entire precinct were included. For community government ex-
penditures and revenue, each community’s budget was downloaded from their website. The 
revenue collected was expected revenue for FY 2018 in the general fund only; no special sourc-
es of revenue were included. The number of major disaster declarations per community was 
obtained from the FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency, n.d.).
Table 1: Community Characteristics Communities in the Study Area
Source: Compiled by authors 
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Analysis and Discussion 
We present the analysis of the qualitative data and examine the results on themes of ambigu-
ity and uncertainty. First, we begin by examining ambiguity in implementation in two ways: 
(1) the credibility of the policy and the agency; and; (2) the credibility of a package of policies. 
Then, we assess uncertainty in implementation through the lenses of the clarity of policy goals 
and local interpretation of policy goals. 
Policy and Agency Credibility 
The perceived credibility of federal and state actors by local government decision makers was 
an important element for policy implementation following Hurricane Harvey. Based on the 
frequency analysis of the interview transcripts, Table 2 demonstrates that FEMA was per-
ceived as not being credible (22 mentions of not credible versus 9 mentions of credible) while 
agencies in the State of Texas were viewed as credible or neutral. This distinction is important 
because FEMA, as the federal agency that formulates most national policies for mitigation, is 
often the source of policy guidance, technical support and funding for local governments to im-
plement disaster mitigation policies. If local governments do not perceive FEMA to be credible, 
it implies that local governments would be unlikely to implement mitigation policies, secure 
funding through FEMA’s grants program, or seek out technical assistance to improve capac-
ity. The US Army Corps of Engineers and the Texas Department of Emergency Management 
were both perceived as being credible actors. Other agencies were mostly neutral, including 
US Housing and Urban Development, US Small Business Administration, Texas General Land 
Office, Texas Department of Transportation, and various NGOs. This is important because 
FEMA’s credibility amongst communities which have experienced fewer disasters is low, while 
the state agencies continue to be viewed as credible. 
Table 2: Frequency of mentions of credibility for federal, state, and local agencies 
Source: The Authors
Proposition 1 stated that policies are unlikely to be implemented when the credibility of the 
actors who formulated the policy is low.  This follows the finding of Lester and Goggin (1998) 
that the key to variability in implementation is based on the “legitimacy and reputation of the 
sender” as well as the “willingness of the receiver.”  To further examine whether local govern-
ments who perceive FEMA as lacking credibility would decide to implement a federal policy at 
all or decide to implement it incompletely (Lester & Goggin, 1998) we analyzed the relationship 
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between perceived agency credibility and policy credibility.  Several communities which found 
FEMA to be not credible still implemented several FEMA polices. Consequently, we examined 
the perceived credibility of various FEMA policies to determine the impact of the credibility of 
the sender (FEMA) on the willingness of the local policy implementers to enact various FEMA 
policies. 
In terms of the credibility of the policies themselves, the analysis demonstrates that many of 
the policies to mitigate and recover from Hurricane Harvey that were available to local gov-
ernments for implementation were viewed as credible. Table 3 shows that land acquisition 
and relocation, revised building codes, Community Development Block Grants (CDBGs), drain-
age projects, base flood elevation modifications, and Hazard Mitigation Grants (HMGs) were 
viewed as credible. 
Table 3: Perceived Credibility of Individual Policies and Programs
Source: The Authors
One theme that emerged in several of the interviews was that FEMA’s grant programs, which 
allowed municipalities to apply for federal funds to offset the cost of purchasing homes in the 
flood plain, were perceived as not credible. For the Post Disaster Buyout Program1 the most 
frequently cited reasoning for buyouts being less credible was loss of the property tax base. 
One respondent stated:
Once you buyout once, you won’t do it again. I’ve not seen another county do it. It’s 
too much of a tax burden on the county. In Bevil Oaks, for example, if you buyout 
a property and the next-door neighbor doesn’t buyout that neighbor complains if 
you don’t do the maintenance. Buyouts also reduce the tax base. In Port Arthur, you 
can’t buyout or you lose your tax base. We bought out after Ike. The problem is that 
we ended up owning the properties and you can’t do anything with them. You lose 
the tax base. Without one doubt that drove the decision-making. Plus, we have to cut 
2 — There are several different FEMA grants which allow municipalities to purchase and remove homes from the flood 
plain at full pre-disaster value. The majority of post-Harvey buyouts would have been done using Post-Disaster Hazard 
Mitigation Grants. In this paper we use the generic term “Post Disaster Buyout Program” to refer to homes purchased 
with Hazard Mitigation Grant money released after a natural disaster.
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grass. We spend millions of dollars per year cutting grass on properties we can’t do 
anything with. No one wants a park there. In Texas, property rights are a big deal. 
Eminent domain lets us do it, but no one in TX believes in it. You are talking about 
property that’s been in families in generations – you can’t take it.
The programs themselves tended to be evaluated independently of the local policy maker’s 
opinion of the federal organization. This observation is supported by the fact that a commu-
nity’s overall impression of whether FEMA was credible did not impact their belief in the cred-
ibility of FEMA’s guidelines for base flood elevation/building codes. In fact, those who found 
FEMA to be “not credible” were slightly more likely to find building codes/freeboard/base flood 
elevation standards credible. For the Post Disaster Buyout Program, communities which found 
the Post Disaster Buyout Program credible were more likely to find FEMA credible. As shown 
in Figures 1, 2, and 3, a community’s perspective on the credibility of the Post Disaster Buyout 
Program did not appear to be related to their view of the credibility of the FEMA standards 
pertaining to building codes/freeboard/base flood elevation. 
Figure 1: Perceived credibility of FEMA and the Post Disaster Buyout Program
Source: The Authors
Figure 2: Perceived credibility of FEMA and building codes/enforcement of base flood eleva-
tion/freeboard requirements 
Source: The Authors
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Figure 3: Perceived credibly of the Post Disaster Buyout Program and perceived credibility 
of restrictive building codes/enforcement of base flood elevation/freeboard requirements 
Source: The Authors
To better understand the influence of disasters on implementation, we conceive of them as 
focusing events (Birkland, 1997), and the accumulation of experience with disasters over time 
can lead to policy change (O’Donovan, 2017a). Experience with hurricanes appears to be a 
crucial factor in the communities’ perceived credibility of FEMA. The more major disaster dec-
larations a community experienced, the more likely they were to view FEMA as credible. The 
crosstab analysis of the number of major disaster declarations a community had experienced 
between 1997-2017 and their perceived credibility of FEMA revealed that among the commu-
nities which had experienced a higher number of disasters, 62% found FEMA credible or were 
neutral, compared to just 38% which found FEMA not credible. For those communities which 
experienced a lower number of major disaster declarations related to flooding, 67% found 
FEMA not credible, whereas 33% were neutral or found FEMA to be credible.
Table 4: Number of Focusing Events by Perceived Credibility of FEMA
Source: The Authors
The Post Disaster Buyout Program can be characterized as a policy where ambiguity is low. 
Local policy officials understood the buyout mechanism and the resources required to imple-
ment the Post Disaster Buyout Program. For those policy makers which found the Post Disas-
ter Buyout Program to be less credible, they often cited the loss of the property tax base and 
the increased maintenance costs associated with the program. This is consistent with what was 
observed regarding the buyout program in Texas; where powerful policy makers favored the 
program, buyouts occurred, and where powerful policy makers opposed the program, it was 
not implemented. 
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Another policy with low ambiguity is implementing more stringent building codes, including 
higher standards for base flood elevation and freeboard. However, policy maker’s expressed 
concern about the rising cost of construction and political push back regarding increased 
building standards. One theme that quickly emerged was that most of the political pushback, 
both from policy makers and the general public, subsided after experiencing a flooding event 
firsthand and observing that those buildings built to a higher standard had a much higher sur-
vival rate. This is consistent with our earlier observation that communities which encountered 
more disasters were more likely to perceive FEMA as credible. 
Drawing on the work of Lester and Goggin (1998), Proposition 1 stated that policies are un-
likely to be implemented when the credibility of the actors who formulated the policy is low. 
While we did find support for Proposition 1, we found that the relationship between credibil-
ity, policy, and policy implementation is multifaceted. Some communities which did not find 
FEMA credible still found certain FEMA policies credible, and went forward with the plan to 
implement them. Additionally, communities with more experience tended to find FEMA more 
credible. Thus, the relationship between credibly and policy implementation varied based on 
three important dimensions: the credibility of (1) the agency that formulated the policy; (2) 
the specific policy tool itself; and (3) the experience level of local government policy makers. 
Credibility and Policy Packages
Certain policy tools to mitigate the effects of hurricanes are stand-alone policies, like building 
code changes and base flood elevation modifications. They are not part of a larger package of 
policies, in contrast to the Community Development Block Grant—Disaster Recovery program 
(CDBG-DR), which provides funding for recovery that includes support for mitigation, hous-
ing, and other post-disaster recovery efforts that prioritize low-income communities. 
For stand-alone policies, the goals are clear, the objectives are discrete, and their impact is 
readily observable. For example, several communities have cited that the reason they believe 
in these standards is because they could observe, first-hand, how properties built to the new 
standards faired during Harvey. As one respondent noted:
I have a great photo from May 16th when we had a flood. Its aerial from a drone. 
There is a Mexican food restaurant built to new codes, and it’s high and dry sur-
rounded by water. It told the story.
In contrast, the CDBG-DR is a major deferral policy that is designed as part of a so- called 
“package deal” for post-disaster mitigation and long-term recovery, the CDBG-DR program, 
run through the US Department of Housing and Urban Development. These CDBG grants are 
large grants of federal aid to rebuild or restore housing, assist with community development 
and mitigate the future effects of disasters. CDBG grants come with significant funding but 
are accompanied by many rules and requirements that local governments may perceive as not 
meeting local standards. 
The CDBG grants were mentioned in interviews, but the analysis does not demonstrate the 
phenomenon of package deals as being nearly as problematic as the literature indicates that 
they should be. CDBG-DR block grants were mentioned in 5 interviews, but their credibility 
was only discussed in 3 interviews, and in only 1 did the interview subject perceived them to be 
credible. We did find support for this phenomenon in that the CDBG-DR grants were policies 
with very high ambiguity. Where political will to implement CDBGs was high, policy makers 
and grass roots coalitions combined to garner support. The one community where political 
support was high stated the following: 
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I’m proud of our commissioners. They are dedicated to using the Community Devel-
opment Block Grant for its purpose, for low-moderate income areas and not for cost-
sharing with other grant programs.  Using for cost-share is not using the CDBG’s how 
they are intended, and cannibalizes that money.  We have a 2.5-million-dollar bond 
going on the ballot to help us make sure CDBG money stays where it needs to go.  We 
will use federal money to cost share.
However, in the other 2 interviews that mentioned CDBG-DR and thought it lacked credibility, 
they either perceived that it was a federal cram-down or they felt the requirements were inap-
propriate for their local context. For example, a comment from one participant with themes 
about package deals with CDBG block grants was:
Storms don’t discriminate based on income, I get why it’s need based, but you can 
have money that you can spend in a non-low-moderate census track, a pond that 
benefits a low-moderate track, and it won’t be eligible. That means with regards to 
infrastructure funding, you may not be able to place the money where it can do the 
most good for the most people.
Thus, we accept that we have mixed and weak findings for Proposition 2 and can neither accept 
nor reject the theory that policies are unlikely to be implemented when they are part of a pack-
age of policy programs. We did find support for the idea that stand alone polices are easier to 
implement. 
Clarity of Policy Goals 
There is still a gap between the way federal policies are designed to work and the way that lo-
cal policy makers understand how these policies are supposed to be implemented. As Table 5 
demonstrates, local policy makers felt the federal communication of information and of policy 
goals were unclear.
Table 5: Local government perception of the clarity of information and messages sent by 
federal and state government agencies. 
Source: The Authors
State communication was perceived as being clear (3) compared to being explicitly unclear (1). 
This reinforces the idea that states can play a key role between the federal government and local 
policy makers. Public statements by TDEM were nearly identical to FEMA, which suggests that 
clarity of policy messages, like beauty, may be in the eye of the beholder. Federal policy goals 
were more likely to be unclear (6) than clear (3). State policy goals were viewed as being unclear 
in one instance and clear in zero instances. This is consistent with what would be expected 
because federal flood mitigation policy is constructed at the federal level, and therefore state 
policy goals are unlikely to be a factor. 
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The EBPM framework suggests that policy makers intend to make the “right” decisions by seek-
ing out evidence to determine the best policy solutions (Cairney, 2019). However, they are re-
stricted by limited time and attention. In the case of post-flooding policy implementation and 
consistent with what we found in our interviews, local policy makers desired to obtain grants 
from FEMA to engage in recovery and mitigation projects. One common theme throughout 
many interviews was that local officials did not have a solid understanding of FEMA policies 
or goals. Many respondents expressed frustration and confusion with the intergovernmen-
tal implementation process. Despite acknowledging that they had attended FEMA sponsored 
workshops and received assistance with grant writing, it was clear that many local officials 
were unable to reduce the uncertainty of the available policy tools.
One important example of this confusion is that local governments had an understanding of 
disaster mitigation that was distinctly different from their federal and state counterparts. At 
the local level in several municipalities, local policy makers used the term mitigation to broadly 
apply to many functions that are academically and federally defined as either preparedness or 
recovery. As a result, there was a great deal of confusion with local policy makers applying for 
federal mitigation focused grants to accomplish recovery or preparedness related items. These 
grants were subsequently fraught with problems, going through multiple rounds of drafts or 
being ultimately rejected. The literature indicates that uncertainty about technical information 
should be resolved by more information (Jones, 2003; Simon, 1991), yet despite FEMA push-
ing information and workshops, local policy makers remained unable to successfully apply for 
grants, growing frustrated with FEMA in the process. 
A common example of this uncertainty about what hazard mitigation is generally and what the 
goals and activities are that are supported by the HMGP is as follows:
I have one project that they ruled totally ineligible, which is stupid. It’s all about the 
communication; every piece of communication was taken out for six weeks. Do you 
know under the Hazard Mitigation Program I can’t create a fiber optic loop to correct 
that because it wasn’t there before. It’s the most asinine thing I’ve ever seen.
Another example of a local government official expressing frustration about FEMA and trying 
to obtain hazard mitigation funding after Hurricane Harvey conflates mitigation with recovery 
and preparedness activities and demonstrates a misunderstanding of what federal mitigation 
policies can be used to achieve at the local level:
FEMA is terribly slow; we are coming up on 2 years and we don’t have a water tower. 
We lost our water tower in the storm. The water still flows; the water tower creates 
pressure. We are maintaining water pressure with pumps. It fluctuates. It’s hard on 
our infrastructure. When we started with FEMA, we had an 8-leg water tower, but it 
sat in the flood plain. We wanted to get a modern single stem storm resistant water 
tower. We sold it as mitigation for the future. Yay all good. But then they said it’s not 
mitigation, it’s improvement [so] we can only put back what you had. We get to the 
end of that and they changed their mind again. We are getting what we wanted to 
start with, but it has been frustrating.
In many communities, local policy making officials were frustrated because they failed to un-
derstand why their hazard mitigation grants were rejected. Many of these projects were not 
mitigation projects. An example is grants to “harden critical facilities”, install communication 
equipment, and build shelters. Contrary to what we would expect, the condition of uncertainty 
persists despite instructions attached to FEMA grants and local municipalities conveying that 
they attended workshops hosted by FEMA on the grant process. In our analysis, in communi-
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ties whose definition of mitigation did not match FEMA’s, 50% reported being frustrated with 
FEMA. In communities that understood FEMA’s definition of mitigation, only 21% gave an-
swers indicating they were frustrated with FEMA. Unclear communication of policy preferenc-
es from the federal level adversely influenced policy implementation, as indicated in Table 6. 
Table 6: Impact of the understanding of FEMA’s definition of mitigation and a communi-
ties’ level of frustration with FEMA 
Source: The Authors
Thus, we find there is support for Proposition 3; policies are unlikely to be implemented when 
policy makers send messages about the goals of a policy that are unclear.
Capacity and Interpretation of Policy Goals
The EBPM framework states that local decision makers are boundedly rational individuals who 
strive to make the best decisions possible, while operating under significant time constraints 
(Jones, 2003; Simon, 1991). It argues that decision makers will attempt to gather evidence to 
make the best decision possible while recognizing that there are barriers (time and attention) 
that will prevent optimal decision making (Cairney, 2019). The ability of local officials to make 
decisions should be influenced by both cognitive ability and governing capacity. Governing 
capacity is conceived of as an important factor for creating the conditions under which ground-
level implementers can interpret a policy in a way that is consistent with its goals. 
Conventionally, we would expect that a lack of understanding about mitigation to be consid-
ered uncertainty about technical or scientific information (Jenkins-Smith et al, 2014; Weible 
et al, 2009). We therefore proposed that municipalities with more governing capacity are likely 
to be better suited to interpret policy goals. We used the number of full-time equivalent mu-
nicipal employees and general fund revenue per capita as indicators of governing capacity. We 
hypothesized that municipal governments with higher rates of employees per capita and rev-
enue per capita would have more resources to invest in interpretation of policy goals. We found 
that greater governing capacity did not translate to better understanding of the definition of 
mitigation or less frustration with FEMA. 
Many of the post-disaster policies available to local decision makers have distinct goals, either 
recovery or mitigation related. An important part of implementing those policies is submitting 
a grant application that details how the local government will reach those recovery or mitiga-
tion related goals. We found that in communities where there was uncertainty about the goals 
of a policy, they were unsuccessful in applying for those grants. 
Interestingly, policy makers from municipalities with less general fund revenue per capita and 
fewer employees per capita were slightly more likely to understand FEMA’s definition of miti-
gation and slightly less likely to be frustrated with FEMA.  To further understand this phe-
nomenon, we decided to examine the impact of experience with the policy problem as another 
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possible explanation. We operationalized experience with the policy problem as the number of 
hurricanes for which federal aid was authorized over a 20-year (1997-2017) period. We found 
that municipalities with more experience responding to hurricanes were far more likely to un-
derstand FEMA’s definition of mitigation and to be less frustrated with FEMA. We conclude 
that while we find support for Proposition 4 - that policies are unlikely to be implemented 
when policy implementers are unable to interpret the goals of the policy - we posit that experi-
ence, not governing capacity, is key to municipalities understanding the goals of policies and 
successfully implementing them. The results are presented in Table 7. 
Table 7: Understanding of Mitigation and Frustration with FEMA by Community Charac-
teristics 









General Fund Revenue per 
Capita
Higher (>$1000.00) 4 4 7 1
Lower (≤ 999.99) 10 4 8 6
Number of Full-Time 
Equivalent Municipal 
Employees per Capita
More (> .008) 5 6 7 4
Fewer (≤.007) 9 2 8 3
Number of Focusing Events
Several (>15) 11 2 11 2
Some (≤14) 3 6 4 5
Source: The Authors
Uncertainty and Ambiguity 
For Propositions 1, 3, and 4, we find support for the connection between the clarity of the 
message, the clarity of the goals of the policy, and policy implementation. Most surprisingly, 
we found evidence of more ambiguity in implementation than we had anticipated. There was 
ambiguity in how local government officials perceived the federal government’s policy goals 
and preferences for how to mitigate after Hurricane Harvey. But more importantly there was 
considerable evidence that the amount of experience local government officials had contrib-
uted to both their ability to understand federal governmental activities in disaster governance 
and their ability to navigate ambiguous conditions surrounding policy implementation. 
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Successful policy implementation requires reducing both uncertainty and ambiguity, and the 
literature suggests that where uncertainty can be reduced by more information, ambiguity 
cannot be reduced because there will always be multiple ways of interpreting situations. In 
our study, we found overwhelmingly that experience reduced both uncertainty and ambiguity, 
leading us to conclude that the terms are closer than the literature would suggest, and that 
experience is key in policy implementation. We find ambiguity and uncertainty to be two sides 
of the same coin.  In our findings training workshops, grant writing assistance, and other pro-
grams designed to reduce uncertainty were unsuccessful. This suggests that the distinction be-
tween uncertainty and ambiguity may be less clear than the literature suggests, and additional 
information does not always lessen uncertainty.
Results and Implications 
This study sheds light on the roles of ambiguity and uncertainty in implementation, where am-
biguity is related to the credibility of the policy and uncertainty is related to the clarity of the 
policy. Fundamentally, we find that despite distinctions in the literature that ambiguity lies in 
political decision making and uncertainty resides in rational decision making, the two concepts 
effectively pose the same challenges for implementation. Specifically, our findings have three 
main theoretical and practical implications.
First, we find that local governments evaluate the credibility of policies separately from the 
credibility of the agency that formulate them. With regards to credibility, we proposed that 
policies were unlikely to be implemented when the credibility of the actors who formulated 
the policy was low. While we did find support for this theory, we also discovered that policies 
appeared to be evaluated for implementation more on their impact on the municipality rather 
than by the credibility of the agency which authored it. Local governments understand the Post 
Disaster Buyout Program, but buyouts are considered to not to be credible because of their neg-
ative impact on the tax base of local municipalities. In contrast, base flood elevation/freeboard 
guidelines are seen as more credible because local officials have been able to observe the impact 
of the new standards firsthand. Thus, a community’s overall impression of whether FEMA was 
credible did not impact their belief in the credibility of FEMA’s guidelines for base flood eleva-
tion/building codes. In fact, those who found FEMA to be “not credible” were slightly more 
likely to find building codes/freeboard/base flood elevation standards credible. Communities 
which found the Post Disaster Buyout Program credible were more likely to find FEMA cred-
ible. However, a community’s view on the credibility of the Post Disaster Buyout Program did 
not appear to be related to their view of the credibility of the FEMA standards pertaining to 
building codes/freeboard/base flood elevation. 
Second, we find that ambiguity is conditional in implementation. The ambiguity around the 
choice of a policy tool to implement after a disaster is moderated by the experience of a local 
government and its capacity to implement. This finding adds to our understanding of ambiguity 
in decision making that previously suggested that ambiguity could not be reduced. Ambiguity 
is more often present and important than we anticipated in local government decision-making 
about implementation of hazard mitigation policies. The lack of an agreed upon understand-
ing was a crucial point of failure. Communities which had a definition of mitigation which was 
not consistent with FEMA’s were far more likely to report being “extremely frustrated” with 
FEMA. The term mitigation was defined by FEMA in grant instructions and likely covered in 
grant workshops. When local policy makers failed to understand how FEMA defines mitiga-
tion, they became frustrated with FEMA, not the Hazard Mitigation Grant Process, which they 
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still viewed as credible. Another important finding is that communities which had experienced 
more focusing events were more likely to have an understanding of the term mitigation that 
was consistent with FEMA’s.  Thus, it appears that while ambiguity leads to a great deal of 
frustration throughout policy implementation, experience is an important mitigating factor. 
While, broadly speaking, we found experience lessened frustration with FEMA, we also found 
evidence that experience with a specific policy tool that is being considered for implementa-
tion matters. Where policy makers have had the opportunity to observe the efficacy of a policy 
firsthand (base flood elevation, building codes) they will see it as credible regardless of the 
credibility of the federal institution (FEMA). Experience also lessened frustration with FEMA, 
with communities that have experienced more disasters more likely to understand FEMA’s 
definition of mitigation, to find FEMA more credible, and to be less frustrated with FEMA.  The 
implication is that experience with a policy problem acts as a mediating and facilitating factor 
in implementation.
One important factor to help promote implementation is involvement of state agencies. Over-
whelmingly, state institutions and process were viewed as more credible than federal institu-
tions and processes; this reinforces the idea that state governments are important intermedi-
aries between federal and local governments in policy implementation.
Third, we find that uncertainty influences policy implementation in a way that is more similar 
to ambiguity than previously considered. In many instances, uncertainty was not reduced by 
more information. This suggests that the effect of uncertainty is similar to ambiguity, support-
ing our “two sides of the same coin” argument about the concepts and their theoretical and 
empirical roles. Policy and disaster experience act as a moderating effect on implementation 
conflict and is associated with policies being perceived as credible.  In addition, experience 
lessens both ambiguity and uncertainty. 
In our analysis we observed frequent misunderstandings of what flood mitigation is and the 
tools available, resulting in confusion about the types of local projects eligible for federal miti-
gation programs. Conventionally, we would expect that a lack of understanding of mitigation 
to be considered uncertainty about technical and scientific information (Jenkins-Smith et al., 
2014; Weible et al., 2009) that could be resolved with more information (Feldman, 1989; Wil-
son, 1998). However, we found that uncertainty functioned more like ambiguity in that mis-
understandings persisted in spite of both FEMA and local officials reporting frequent, high 
levels of technical assistance. The implication is that the distinction between the political ma-
nipulation of ambiguous circumstances and the rational, technocratic approach to gathering 
more information to reduce uncertainty may be less clear, theoretically and empirically, than 
previously considered.  
Finally, we failed to find support for the idea that policies which are part of a package of poli-
cy programs are less likely to be implemented. This is inconsistent with other findings in the 
policy literature, particularly the Multiple Streams Framework (Zahariadis, 2008; Zahariadis 
& Exadaktylos, 2016). There are three potential explanations: the theory does not withstand 
empirical testing; our data is insufficient; and the case of Hurricane Harvey is not suitable for 
testing this piece of the theory. We suspect that packages or policies are indeed problematic 
and our data hints at this. However, we cannot support this proposition. Furthermore, we are 
unconvinced that ambiguity is the reason why packages of policies are problematic. We suspect 
that reluctance to apply federal policy preferences to a local problem might be another explana-
tion. Further study is needed to examine the challenges of untangling the meaning of packages 
of polices. 
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In conclusion, there are two broad implication of this research for the study of policy pro-
cess and policy implementation. First, for theories of the policy process that make assump-
tions about ambiguous decision-making circumstances, like the Multiple Streams Framework, 
or conditions of uncertainty in a policy community, like the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 
these findings suggest that ambiguity and uncertainty can mediated by experience over time. 
Furthermore, ambiguity may be lessened by using state agencies, which were viewed by local 
policy makers as being more credible, to send important messages about policy tools. Some-
what confoundingly, in this study, uncertainty was not lessened with more information. This 
has important implications for theories of the policy process that emphasize the importance 
of information, like policy learning and evidence-based policy making. Second, for policy im-
plementation, the findings from this study represent a set of empirical findings that are a step 
forward for unpacking the politics of implementation in a nested system of government. Un-
derstanding how local governments choose which policies to implement seems to hinge in part 
on capacity. However, future research is necessary to assess the influence of the means, willing-
ness and organizational capacity of government on decision making in policy implementation. 
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Appendix A
Coding of Key Variables




FEMA, DHS, HUD, SBA, 
Army Corps, NOAA, 
TDEM, TDOT, GLO, 
TASB, SEAGRANT, TEX-








Federal or State Recovery, Mitigation, 
Preparedness, Response, 
General Disaster Policy




Federal or State Recovery, Mitigation, 
Preparedness, Response, 
General Disaster Policy
Frustration Mention that 
conveys the speaker 
is frustrated






instructions or messages 
from the sender are clear 
or unclear







Mention that conveys 
the speaker has a 
definition of mitigation 
which is not consistent 
with FEMA’s definition
FEMA
